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ABSTRACT 
 
In every state except Montana, at-will employment is 
the default rule, leaving employers free to discharge 
employees for their use of social media. The National 
Labor Relations Act’s (NLRA) protection of collective 
action, however, is emerging as a substantial limitation to 
at-will terminations. In Hispanics United of Buffalo, the 
National Labor Relations Board concluded that Facebook 
posts critical of the non-profit employer were protected as 
collective action and that the employer’s retaliatory 
termination of five employees violated Section 8 of the 
NLRA. To be protected as collective action under the 
NLRA, an employee’s use of social media must be 
“concerted,” somehow involving other coworkers, and for 
the purpose of mutual aid. The employee may lose this 
protection if her words or conduct are opprobrious, 
insubordinate, or disloyal as to disrupt the work 
environment. Furthermore, an employer remains free to 
terminate the employee for other legitimate reasons 
unrelated to collective action. Finally, an employer may not 
distribute or enforce a social media policy which chills or 
potentially chills collective action. 
                                                                                                             
* Bryan Russell, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2013. 
Thank you to my student editor, Luke Rona, for his enduring patience and 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Social media permeates the American workplace. Access to 
social networks has expanded through the use of cell phones, 
personal computers, netbooks, work stations, and every device in 
between. Employees use these platforms to communicate with 
their coworkers, manage projects, send data, organize 
presentations, and accomplish tasks related to their employment. 
Employees also use these platforms to harass, complain, and 
slander their employer, potentially threatening a company’s good 
will, culture, reputation, and bottom line. 
Unsurprisingly, harassment, complaining, and slander can 
serve as a basis for termination. Unless otherwise negotiated, at-
will employment is the default rule, and employees may be 
terminated for their use of social media. However, if an 
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employee’s use of social media constitutes collective action under 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), she may be protected 
from termination.  
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has applied 
existing legal concepts to emerging issues concerning social media 
use. In analyzing whether an employee’s use of social media is 
protected, the NLRB still determines whether there is concerted 
activity and whether an employee is fired in violation of the 
NLRA. Generally, “[t]he legal principle that insubordination, 
disobedience or disloyalty is adequate cause for discharge is plain 
enough.”1 In extending its traditional protections for collective 
action to social media, the NLRB has looked to established legal 
principles and case law. As described in the 1953 case NLRB v. 
Local Union No. 1229, IBEW, “The difficulty arises in determining 
whether, in fact, the discharges are made because of such a 
separable cause or because of some other concerted activities 
engaged in for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection which may not be adequate cause for discharge.”2 
With social media, whether an employee was terminated for 
collective action or some other independent reason remains a 
nuanced determination of fact.  
This Article will first outline, in Section I, the controlling 
law for establishing collective action and determining whether 
protection has been lost. Section II will enumerate and analyze 
cases in which the employees’ conduct was deemed concerted 
activity. Section III will examine cases where the employees’ 
actions fell outside the scope of the NLRA’s protection. 
Section IV discusses how employers can use precedent to 
create a viable social media policy. The Article concludes with 
practice pointers for both employers and employees.  
 
I. THE BLACK LETTER LAW: PROTECTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE 
ACTION UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT  
 
Because the NLRA’s statutory language does not address use 
                                                                                                             
1 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464, 475 (1953). 
2 Id. 
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of social media, the NLRB has applied existing case law 
addressing employees’ right to engage in concerted activity to 
decide emerging issues associated with social media use. Section 7 
of the NLRA states that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”3 Section 8 of the Act 
enforces these rights by prohibiting employers from engaging in 
unfair labor practices. Namely, an employer may not “interfere 
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in Section 7.”4 Consequently, to be protected under the 
NLRA, an employee’s action must be (1) concerted and (2) for the 
purpose of mutual aid or protection. 
Concerted activities include those “engaged in with or on the 
authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of 
the employee himself,”5 as well as those made by “individual 
employees seek[ing] to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group 
action.”6 Mutual aid and protection refers to the underlying 
purpose of the Act to allow “employees to band together in 
confronting an employer regarding the terms and conditions of 
their employment.”7  
This protection can be lost if the employee’s conduct is 
opprobrious, insubordinate, or disloyal to the point of disrupting 
the work environment.8 To determine whether an employee has 
lost NLRA protection, the NLRB has distinguished between an 
employee outburst made to the employer (or supervisor) and those 
made to third parties, such as the press or general public.9 For 
outbursts made against or to a supervisor, the NLRB applies a 
                                                                                                             
3 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).  
4 Id. at § 158(a)(1). 
5 Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984). 
6 Meyers Inds., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986).  
7 NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984). 
8 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, 346 U.S. 464, 475 (1953); Atlantic Steel 
Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816-817 (1979); Will & Baumer Candle Co., Inc., 206 
N.L.R.B. 772, 774 (1973). 
9 OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING 
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2011). 
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four-factor balancing test to determine whether an employee has 
crossed this line, considering: “(1) the place of the discussion; (2) 
the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the 
employee's outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any way, 
provoked by an employer's unfair labor practice.”10 For outbursts 
directed to third parties, the NLRB analyzes whether the outburst 
is protected as “part of an appeal for support in the pending 
dispute,” or whether the outburst constitutes an unprotected 
“separable attack purporting to be made in the interest of the public 
rather than in that of the employees.”11  
With Facebook and Twitter, the relevant legal issue is still 
whether the employee engaged in collective action for the purpose 
of mutual aid, and subsequently, whether such protection is lost 
based on the severity of the employee’s conduct. The following 
sections will discuss key cases from the recent Report of the Acting 
General Counsel Concerning Social Media Cases, and the 
underlying facts and reasoning in cases where the employee’s 
conduct was held to be protected as concerted activity under the 
NLRA.12  
 
II. EXAMPLES OF DISCHARGES PROHIBITED BY THE NLRA 
 
In determining whether an employee’s use of social media is 
protected under the NLRA as concerted activity, the NLRB 
focuses its inquiry on the two main elements of collective action: 
activity that is (1) group-related and (2) for mutual aid. 
Recognizing the potential utility for employees to organize with 
and through social media, the NLRB hinges protection on whether 
the employee’s actions related to previous or prospective group 
                                                                                                             
10 Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. at 816 (1979). 
11 Local Union No. 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. at 477; OFFICE OF THE GENERAL 
COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING 
SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 8-9 (2011). 
12 On August 18, 2011, Acting General Counsel for the NLRB released to 
the public its REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL 
MEDIA CASES (2011) to discuss “emerging issues concerning the protected 
and/or concerted nature of employees’ Facebook and Twitter postings, the 
coercive impact of a union’s Facebook and YouTube postings, and the 
lawfulness of employers’ social media policies and rules.” 
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activity related to terms or conditions of employment. In the 
following cases, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held that 
the employees’ conduct was protected as collective action under 
the NLRA.  
 
A.  Prospective Collective Action: Facebook Discussion of 
Employment Terms and Conditions 
 
The clearest example of protected collective action using social 
media is Hispanics United of Buffalo,13 where an ALJ held that an 
employee’s Facebook post and subsequent comments from 
coworkers were protected as concerted activity. Hispanics United 
of Buffalo (“HUB”) employee Mariana Cole-Rivera posted on 
Facebook, “Lydia Cruz, a coworker feels that we don't help our 
clients enough at HUB. I about had it! My fellow coworkers how 
do u feel?”14 Some of Cole-Rivera’s fellow coworkers responded 
by commenting on the post, asking questions and voicing 
support.15 The next day, the acting manager fired five employees 
for disloyalty, citing the Facebook conversation as the reason.16  
In satisfying the concerted element, the ALJ explained that 
“[i]ndividual action is concerted so long as it is engaged in with the 
object of initiating or inducing group action . . . . The object of 
inducing group action need not be express.”17 Cole-Rivera’s 
express request for opinions from her coworkers met this standard. 
With respect to mutual aid, the ALJ reasoned that complaints about 
terms and conditions need not be first directed to a supervisor or 
the employer.18 Furthermore, exchanges among only coworkers 
                                                                                                             
13 Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520, 
at *10 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011). 
14 OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING 
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 3-5 (2011); Hispanics 
United of Buffalo, Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520, at *9 (N.L.R.B. 
Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011). 
15 Hispanics United of Buffalo, 2011 WL 3894520, at *10. 
16 Id. at *12. 
17 Id. at *16 (citing Whittaker Corp., 289 N.L.R.B. 933 (1988) and 
Mushroom Transp. Co., Inc., v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964)). 
18 Id. (citing Aroostook Cnty. Reg’l Ophthalmology Ctr., 317 N.L.R.B. 218, 
220 (1995) enf. denied on other grounds 81 F. 3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).  
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were deemed sufficient to warrant protection, even if the intent to 
change conditions is not apparent.19 Finally, the ALJ concluded 
that the employees had not lost protection due to opprobrious 
conduct.20 
 
B.  Outgrowth of Collective Action: Facebook Criticisms of 
Employer’s Event  
 
In Karl Knauz Motors, Inc.,21 an employee criticized his 
employer (a car dealership) for providing meager food and 
beverages for a sales event. The employee’s critical photos and 
accompanying comments on Facebook were protected because 
they were “a direct outgrowth of the earlier discussion among the 
salespeople that followed the meeting with management.”22 Based 
on this conclusion, the NLRB found the employee’s lone conduct 
was protected as the logical outgrowth of collective action.23  
In terms of mutual aid and protection, the NLRB found the 
employee’s Facebook comments and photos of an event directly 
influenced the sales staff’s commissions and livelihoods.24 In 
addition to the photos and critical comments posted on Facebook 
about the sales event, the employee also posted online photos and 
comments about a crashed vehicle at a nearby competitor.25 The 
NLRB concluded that this latter conduct did not relate to mutual 
aid or protection and did not constitute collective action.26 Thus, 
there existed an independent basis for termination. Because the 
employee was fired for inappropriately mocking a competitor, the 
NLRB held that the termination did not violate the NLRA.27  
This case indicates that an employee’s use of social media must 
first stem from prior action, or relate to prospective collective 
                                                                                                             
19 Id. 
20 Id. at *20-21 (citing Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979)). 
21 No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 NLRB LEXIS 554, at *8 (Sept. 28, 2011). 
22 OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING 
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 8 (2011). 
23 Karl Knauz Motors, 2011 NLRB LEXIS 554, at *22. 
24 Id. at *5. 
25 Id. at *10. 
26 Id. at *27. 
27 Id. at *35. 
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action, to be protected under the NLRA. Secondly, the use must 
relate to mutual aid or protection. Lastly, the use of social media 
cannot be so opprobrious that protection is lost. While “collective” 
and “mutual aid or protection” are read broadly, this analysis and 
protection under the NLRA does not extend to independent reasons 
for discharge.  
 
III. EXAMPLES OF UNPROTECTED EMPLOYEE CONDUCT  
 
The NLRB explicitly notes the employer’s legitimate interest 
in preserving confidential information and managing good-will, 
reputation, and customer relations. The NLRA does not protect 
employee actions that do not relate to group activity or pertain to 
terms or conditions of employment. Protection is not warranted if 
either of these elements is not satisfied. Even in cases of protected 
collective action, statutory protection can be lost through disloyal 
or disallowed behavior. In line with this reasoning, the following 
cases provide examples where the NLRB found that the 
employee’s conduct was not protected as collective action.  
 
A.  Employee’s Activity Was Neither Concerted nor for Mutual Aid  
 
In Lee Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Arizona Daily Star, a reporter 
posted on Twitter that “[t]he Arizona Daily Star's copy editors are 
the most witty and creative people in the world. Or at least they 
think they are.”28 A week later, a managing editor told the 
employee that he was “prohibited from airing his grievances or 
commenting about the Daily Star in any public forum.”29 
Thereafter, the employee continued to use his social media account 
to post such comments as, “You stay homicidal, Tucson,” 
“What?!?!? No overnight homicide? WTF? You’re slacking 
Tucson,” and “Hope everyone’s having a good Homicide 
Friday.”30 The NLRB concluded that the reporter was terminated 
for these latter comments. The tweets31 neither related to the terms 
                                                                                                             
28 No. 28-CA-23267, 2011 NLRB GCM LEXIS 17, at *4 (Apr. 21, 2011). 
29 Id. at *5. 
30 Id. at *5-6. 
31 “Tweet” refers to a comment published on Twitter, which is then 
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and condition of his employment nor sought to involve other 
employees in employment-related issues.32 Therefore, the 
comments were not protected under the NLRA.33 
 
B.  Mere Reference to Terms and Conditions of Employment is Not 
Concerted Action  
 
In the Report of the Acting General Counsel Concerning Social 
Media, general counsel for the NLRB noted a case where a 
bartender criticized the employer’s tipping policy on Facebook.34 
Although the terminated employee had a conversation with a 
coworker a few months prior, neither that conversation nor the 
Facebook post was an outgrowth of former or prospective action.35 
The bartender’s post did not constitute collective activity because 
it was not an outgrowth of the conversation with the coworker and 
did not relate to any meeting involving other employees or 
management.36   
 
C.  “Individual Gripes, Not Concerted Activity”  
 
An employee’s post of “Wuck Falmart! I swear if this tyranny 
doesn't end in this store they are about to get a wakeup call because 
lots are about to quit!” was not protected under the Act.37 The 
NLRB noted that nothing on the record, including supportive 
comments from coworkers, tied the posts to prior or subsequent 
group activity.38  
                                                                                                             
viewable by followers of the account. Twitter, https://support.twitter 
.com/articles/15367-how-to-post-a-twitter-update-or-tweet# (last visited July 25, 
2012). 
32 Lee Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Arizona Daily Star, No. 28-CA-23267, 2011 
NLRB GCM LEXIS 17, at *4 (Apr. 21, 2011). 
33 Id. 
34 OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING 
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 14 (2011). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Walmart, No. 17-CA-25030, 2011 NLRB GCM LEXIS 34, at *1-2 (July 
19, 2011). 
38 Id. 
9
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These cases seem to indicate that the NLRB is less concerned 
with whether the employee used social media than with the 
underlying purpose of those actions.39 Independent of social media 
use, the NLRB looks to whether an employee’s conduct satisfies 
the elements of collective action. Because the relevant conduct is 
not collective in nature, most Facebook firings or Twitter 
terminations in the course of business are beyond protection under 
the NLRA. 
 
IV. SOCIAL MEDIA POLICIES THAT DO NOT CHILL SECTION 7 
ACTIVITIES 
 
One concern with social media is that every employee has the 
ability to represent the business online, independent of the 
employer’s wishes or control. In response, many employers create 
guidelines and disseminate a social media policy. Employers must 
proceed carefully to ensure that such policies do not chill, or even 
potentially chill, collective action activities.40  
An employer’s guidelines constitute an unfair labor practice if 
“the rules would reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise 
of their Section 7 rights.”41 Both explicit as well as implicit limits 
on employees’ Section 7 rights to collective action are unlawful.42 
The NLRB notes in its report on social media cases: 
First, a rule is unlawful if it explicitly restricts 
Section 7 activities. If the rule does not explicitly 
restrict protected activities, it is unlawful only upon 
a showing that: (1) employees would reasonably 
construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; 
(2) the rule was promulgated in response to union 
                                                                                                             
39 See generally OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE 
ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2011). 
40 The N.L.R.B.’s Office of the General Counsel recently released an 
internal memorandum regarding social media policies, including multiple 
analyses and examples. MEMORANDUM OM 12-59 (May 30, 2012), available 
at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580a375cd. 
41 Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998).  
42 Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc. (Lutheran Heritage), 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 
647 (2004). 
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activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict 
the exercise of Section 7 rights.43  
This rule advises employers to be cautious and specific in drafting 
social media policies, but more importantly to be tactful and 
deliberate when enforcing or invoking the policy.  
The language of a social media policy cannot be phrased so as 
to discourage protected activity.44 Even after drafting an 
enforceable social media policy, an employer must look to the 
specific facts of an incident to determine whether wielding that 
policy would restrict collective action.45 But the NLRB 
acknowledges that employers do have a legitimate interest in 
preventing the disclosure of confidential information and 
maintaining order and discipline in the workplace.46 The following 
cases illustrate the limitations to an enforceable social media 
policy.  
 
A.  Social Media Policy Too Restrictive 
 
Without naming the case, General Counsel for NLRB 
discussed in his report an employer’s blogging and Internet policy 
that prohibited employees from making disparaging remarks about 
the company or supervisors or depicting the company in the media 
without permission.47 The NLRB held that this social media policy 
was too broad and thus unenforceable.48 Citing University Medical 
Center,49 the NLRB found the first policy unlawful because it 
“contained no limiting language to inform employees that it did not 
apply to Section 7 activity.”50 The second policy concerning media 
                                                                                                             
43 OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING 
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 12 (2011). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Rafael Gely and Leonard Bierman, Social Isolation and American 
Workers: Employee Blogging and Legal Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 
312 (2007). 
47 OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING 
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 6 (2011). 
48 Id. 
49 335 N.L.R.B. 1318, 1320-22 (2001). 
50 OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING 
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depictions unlawfully prevented employees from posting pictures 
of protected activities.51  
 
B.  Heated Language Still Protected as Concerted Action 
 
General Counsel for NLRB’s report also discussed an 
employee handbook containing a rule against inappropriate 
discussions about the company, management, or coworkers.52 The 
employer invoked this rule to terminate an employee for Facebook 
posts that used foul language to criticize the employer’s 
administration of state income tax.53 The NLRB found this policy 
and the discharge unlawful because it “could reasonably be 
interpreted to restrain Section 7 activity.”54 Although the heated 
language was not a response to any unfair labor practice, the 
NRLB found that the place, subject manner, and nature of the 
outburst favored the terminated employee.55 The NLRB was 
particularly disapproving of the employer’s use of litigation as a 
threat.56  Because the policy could potentially chill collective 
action, the NLRB found the policy unlawful.57  
 
C.  Violation of Employer’s Code of Conduct  
 
In Rural Metro,58 a dispatcher criticized her employer and the 
allocation of federal grants in response to a Facebook post made by 
her United States Senator. In her post, she referenced an incident 
“where the volunteer fire fighters/first responders didn't even know 
how to perform CPR,” disclosing information considered 
confidential by the employer according to the terms of its code of 
                                                                                                             
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 6 (2011).  
51 Id. at 10. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 10-11. 
54 Id. 
55 Atlantic Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979). 
56 OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING 
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 10 (2011). 
57 Id. at 11. 
58 No. 25-CA-31802, 2011 NLRB GCM LEXIS 30, at *1-2 (June 29, 2011). 
12
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol8/iss1/3
2012] FACEBOOK FIRINGS AND TWITTER TERMINATIONS 41 
 
ethics and business conduct policy.59 Again, although the post 
referred to terms and conditions of employment (wages in this 
case), the post did not relate to previous or prospective collective 
action and was therefore not protected under the act.60 Because of 
this, the NLRB found that the violation of the employer’s policy 
was an independent reason for termination that did not violate the 
NLRA.61  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For an employee’s use of social media to be protected under 
the NLRA as collective action, it must be concerted and made for 
the purpose of mutual aid or protection. In the context of social 
media, a post, blog, or tweet is concerted if it relates to prior or 
prospective collective action. However, if the employee’s use of 
social media is sufficiently opprobrious, protection under the 
NLRA is lost. An employer remains free to terminate for other 
legitimate reasons unrelated to collective action. Lastly, an 
employer may not distribute or enforce a social media policy 
which chills or potentially chills collective action.  
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Both employers and employees should utilize privacy 
settings as a means of limiting conversations with 
coworkers when appropriate. 
 Employers should clearly delineate work and non-work 
social media accounts and their use.  
 If utilizing social media for the purpose of collective action, 
employees should make deliberate use of privacy settings.  
 As a general rule, online rants against an employer are 
unlikely to qualify for protection as collective action. 
  
                                                                                                             
59 Id. at *2. 
60 Id. at *3. 
61 Id. at *4.  
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